Proud c<i>olons</i>, proud Frenchmen:settler colonialism and the extreme right in interwar Algeria by Hassett, Dónal
                          Hassett, D. (2018). Proud colons, proud Frenchmen: settler colonialism and
the extreme right in interwar Algeria. Settler Colonial Studies, 8(2), 195-212.
https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2016.1273870
Peer reviewed version
Link to published version (if available):
10.1080/2201473X.2016.1273870
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the accepted author manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Taylor & Francis at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2201473X.2016.1273870 . Please refer to
any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
1 
 
Proud Colons, Proud Frenchmen: Settler Colonialism and the Extreme Right in 
Interwar Algeria 
 
Dónal Hassett 
University of Bristol, UK 
 
donal.hassett@bristol.ac.uk  
 
 
  
2 
 
 
Proud Colons, Proud Frenchmen: Settler Colonialism and the Extreme Right in 
Interwar Algeria 
 
Abstract: 
If any element of colonial Algerian society can be seen to embody a commitment to 
the logic of elimination at the heart of settler colonialism, it is, perhaps, the extreme-
right. With its unabashed defence of European supremacy and its enthusiastic 
celebration of the military and agricultural conquest of the land, the interwar extreme-
right was steeped in the tropes of settler colonial politics. Nevertheless, its embrace of 
both the discourse and the practices typical of political movements in settler colonial 
polities was hampered by the demographic and political realities of colonial rule in 
French Algeria. In particular, the rise of indigenous political movements in the colony 
and the election of the Popular Front in the metropole would force the extreme right 
to move beyond its traditional politics grounded in anti-Semitism and celebrations of 
settler hegemony.  In this paper, I examine the complex blend of strategies pursued 
by movements of the extreme right in Algeria to expand their support among the 
settler population while also seeking to establish a limited foothold among the 
indigenous population. I contend that the leadership of these organisations sought to 
reconcile these seemingly contradictory goals by combining the evocation of cruder 
forms of settler hegemony with a more sophisticated and politically palatable defence 
of exclusion rooted in the rhetoric of French republican imperialism. I ask if this 
concession to the political norms of the metropole should be understood as a 
distinctive feature that places the specific settler colonial context of Algeria and the 
politics practiced there outside of the theoretical and analytical categories proposed 
by settler colonial theory.  
Keywords: Algeria; French colonialism; extreme right; North Africa; imperialism. 
 
On June 30th 1937, a crowd of 6000 gathered in the Western Algerian city of Sidi-Bel-Abbès 
to listen to the leader of interwar France’s largest extreme-right movement, the Parti Social 
Français (PSF). At the end of his speech, the PSF’s leader, the Colonel De La Rocque, used 
the smattering of Arabic he had learned as a young officer in North Africa to address the 
Algerian Muslims in the crowd. Recalling their service during the Great War, the Colonel 
declared: ‘Brothers we were during the war and in the struggle, brothers we will remain 
always in Work and Peace for our France, for our beautiful Algeria’.1 While De La Rocque’s 
defence of the ‘pressing necessity’ of ‘fraternity’ and ‘close collaboration’ between 
‘Frenchmen and indigenes’,2 did not imply support for equality for Algerian imperial 
subjects, this rhetoric seems out of place for the leader of an extreme-right movement that 
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had a strong following among the settler population in Algeria. Yet, as this article will 
demonstrate, over the course of the interwar period, various elements of the extreme-right in 
Algeria developed discourses and practices that went beyond, without ever abandoning, the 
tropes traditionally associated with politics in a settler colonial context. This article contends 
that this shift in rhetoric represents a tacit acknowledgement, by both the metropolitan 
leadership of the extreme right and their followers on the ground in Algeria, of the colony’s 
ambiguous position within the Republic. The study of the political discourse of the extreme 
right in Algeria underlines how even the most radical settler voices adapted their rhetoric and 
their policies in an effort to balance their need for imperial/national sovereignty with the 
constraints this placed on their sovereignty in the colony.  
At the heart of this article is an analysis of the constantly changing triangular dynamic 
that defined politics in the ‘problematic settler colony’3 of Algeria. In his seminal Settler 
Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, Lorenzo Veracini argued for an understanding of the 
colonial situation grounded in a ‘triangular system of relationships’ between ‘the settler 
coloniser, the indigenous colonised and a variety of differently categorised subaltern 
exogenous alterities’.4 In this schema, the role of the metropolitan imperial state is conceived 
of in the following terms:  
Indigenous and subaltern exogenous Others appeal to the European sovereign to 
articulate grievances emanating from settler abuse, the metropolitan agency interposes 
its sovereignty between settler and indigenous or subaltern exogenous communities and 
settlers insist on their capacity to control indigenous policy.5 
For Veracini, this ‘imperial interference’ is resented by settlers, whose eventual goal is to 
assert their sovereignty against both the metropole and ‘indigenous residues’.6 Settler 
sovereignty is thus pitted against that of the imperial metropole and what remains of the 
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indigenous community. Such a model is clearly premised on settlers both desiring and 
successfully pursuing policies to ‘progressively disappear’ the indigenous and exogenous 
‘Others’.7 Whether or not this was the intent of settlers in Algeria, especially those on the 
extreme right, is open to debate. What is beyond question, however, is that the subject 
population in interwar Algeria far exceeded the ‘residues’ of indigenous cultures and 
populations in other settler colonies in North America, for example. The demographic 
realities of the colonial system in interwar Algeria, where indigenous Algerians represented 
86% of the population, Europeans 13% and Jews 1%,8  mean that Veracini’s triangular model 
must be altered significantly if it is to be applied to the analysis of the practice politics in the 
colony. 
As this article will show, even the most ardent defenders of settler rule in interwar 
Algeria, who were to be found on the extreme-right, would have to take the settlers’ 
demographic position as a clear minority into account in their policies and their rhetoric. 
Given that the perpetuation of settler primacy depended on and was vulnerable to shifts in the 
imperial government’s stance on questions of citizenship, subjecthood and sovereignty in the 
colony, they could not simply reject ‘imperial interference’.9 Rather, they simultaneously 
demanded metropolitan intervention to protect their interests in certain areas of policy while 
rejecting it in others. Efforts to assert settler control over politics in the colony would always 
have to be balanced with their reliance on the imperial state to guarantee the security that 
underpinned settler hegemony. Here the distinction between settler sovereignty, understood 
as the autonomy or independence of settlers in governing their own polity, and settler 
primacy, the legally enshrined priority of the settler within the imperial polity, is key. The 
leaders of the European community found themselves torn between the aspiration to pursue 
settler sovereignty by rejecting the limitations placed on them by the republican imperial 
polity and an unwavering commitment to maintaining settler primacy, which was reliant on 
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the coercive power of the imperial state. This tension would give rise to a complex and often 
contradictory set of discourses among the extreme-right in Algeria. They would rapidly adapt 
to the evolving political situation of the colony over the two decades between the two World 
Wars. 
With this in mind, this article will begin with a brief introduction to the history of the 
extreme right in Algeria and its relationship to settler colonial politics. It will then turn to the 
specific case study of the city of Oran in the late 1920s, where the fusion of extreme-right and 
settler colonial politics resulted in significant electoral success. It will demonstrate how the 
movement that came to dominate politics in the city in this period, the Unions Latines (UL), 
may have adopted both the rhetorical flourishes and mobilisation strategies of the French 
extreme right but remained resolutely grounded in the specific settler colonial context. 
Subsequently, it will consider the implantation and evolution of local branches of the 
metropolitan mass movements of the extreme-right in the Algeria of the 1930s. It will analyse 
their complex attempts to recalibrate the triangular dynamic of politics in the colony without 
compromising settler primacy. Finally, this article will use the example of the extreme-right 
in interwar Algeria to offer some insight into the advantages and the limits of the use of 
settler colonial theory. 
 
The extreme right and settler colonial culture in Algeria 
While the mass movements of the extreme right discussed in this article were an 
innovation of the interwar period, they had deep roots in Algeria, stretching back through the 
long history of settler colonial politics. The central narrative of the past adopted by the 
extreme right in the Algeria was both reflective and constitutive of the settler colonial polity. 
The majority of the European political class, across the political spectrum, evoked the history 
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of the conquest of Algeria, ‘by the sword and the plough’, to legitimise their claim to ‘both a 
special sovereign charge and a regenerative capacity’.10 Similar to settler nationalisms 
elsewhere, the nationalism of the European community in Algeria focused on ‘at least two 
spaces of origin’.11 Alongside the mythical brousse, tamed and made productive by the sweat 
and blood of the pioneering settler, it stressed the Mediterranean roots of the settler 
population. This dual origin story served to portray the settler as a European and, thus, a 
civilised man worthy of exercising his own sovereignty, while also affirming that his 
conquest of the land had fundamentally made him anew, tethering him eternally to the soil of 
his new home. These conflicting tendencies, ‘one striving for indigenisation and national 
autonomy, the other aiming at neo-European replication and the establishment of a 
“civilised” pattern of life’, would play a key role in shaping the discourse of the extreme-right 
in interwar Algeria.12 
Settler colonial tropes, long present in the politics of Algeria, were first expressed as a 
coherent ideology by the writer Louis Bertrand in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. In his works, Bertrand argued that the settler population of Algeria constituted a new 
‘Latin race’, forged in the trials and tribulations of the military and agricultural conquest and 
imbued with the potential to regenerate the whole of the French Empire.13 He also evoked the 
colony’s Roman heritage to establish a form of Latin indigeneity in the territory, reducing the 
colony’s Muslim and Jewish population ‘to a mere historical hiatus’14 and allowing settlers 
‘to anchor their present in the neutral zone of a distant Mediterranean past’.15 While 
Bertrand’s importance in the elaboration of a foundation myth for Algeria’s settlers is widely 
recognised, his role as a conduit for the foundational concepts of the French extreme-right in 
the colony is less explicitly acknowledged. In many ways, Bertrand’s work could be 
considered a settler colonial twist on the philosophy of the intellectual father of the French 
extreme-right, Maurice Barrès.16 Where Barrès defended a virulent strand of nationalism by 
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evoking the ‘cult of the land and the dead’,17 Bertrand and his acolytes cast the defence of 
settler sovereignty in terms of a ‘cult of the pioneering colon and the Roman ancestor’. Thus, 
from the outset, the ideological underpinnings of the settler colonial order in Algeria and 
those of the emergent extreme right in the metropole were closely aligned. 
The link between extreme-right ideology and settler colonialism is a historical 
phenomenon that was by no means restricted to French Algeria. The historical comparison 
with other settler colonial situations is most clearly borne out in the case of Libya, Italy’s 
self-imagined ‘Fourth Shore’. Like in Algeria, settlement programmes in Libya sought to 
remake the Roman breadbasket of North Africa while also providing thousands of poor 
peasants with a bright future at the heart of a newly reconfigured trans-Mediterranean 
national space.18 Under the Fascist regime, Libya became the ‘ideal playground’ in which 
both the resurrection of past Roman glory and the forging of the Fascist ‘New Man’ could 
take place.19 In contrast to settlers in the so-called New World, settlement in French and 
Italian North Africa was conceived of not so much as a removal to establish a new polity as a 
return to resurrect an old one.20 The notion of the regenerative power of settlement in the 
colonies, shared across different settler colonial contexts, was combined in these contexts 
with a particular historical vision of the renewal of Empire that closely paralleled the 
extreme-right embrace of what Roger Griffin has called ‘palingenesis’.21 Settler politics in 
Algeria would inevitably be shaped by this belief that redemption would come through a 
rebirth of a polity in which settler and imperial sovereignties were intertwined.   
If the works of Bertrand and others provided the philosophical framework for settler 
primacy in Algeria, it was the colonial legal code, and in particular the distinction between 
subject, national and citizen that practically enabled settler dominance of political life in the 
colony. Under the Sénatus-Consulte of 1865, the indigenous population of Algeria, Jewish 
and Muslim, were legally recognised as French nationals but not French citizens, governed 
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by their personal status as subjects of Koranic or Mosaic Law.22 Strict criteria for 
naturalisation were set out, including the repudiation of the personal status, which, in 
practice, would render naturalisation both almost practically impossible and culturally 
repugnant to the vast majority of the indigenous population. The supposed incompatibility of 
the personal status with citizenship and the rights it entailed remained the essential legal 
foundation of the exclusion of indigenous peoples from political power in the colony and, 
hence, the bedrock of settler primacy. Any breach of this principle would represent an 
existential threat to the settler polity, one that would have to be crushed at all costs. 
This was one of the key motivations behind the anti-Semitism that permeated settler 
colonial politics in Algeria, a key element in the rise of the extreme right in the interwar 
period. The virulent anti-Semitism that was a feature of Algerian politics from the 1870s 
onwards is a classic case of settler aggression against perceived ‘exogenous others that reside 
within the bounds of the settler entity’.23 The extension of citizenship to Algeria’s Jewish 
population by the Crémieux Decree of 1870 gave rise to a violent hostility on the part of the 
settler population towards the Jews. This reflected a dual anxiety on the part of the settler 
community. On the one hand, the ever-present fear of a weakening of the differentiation 
between the indigenous and the settler, and the consequent undermining of settler primacy, 
fuelled anti-Jewish sentiment in the colony. On the other, the elevation of the colony’s Jews 
to full citizenship at a time when many of the European migrants that flocked to the colony 
were still legally considered foreigners, underlined the precarity of settler sovereignty when it 
was the metropolitan government who was the ultimate arbiter of citizenship rights.24  
The mass naturalisation of the children of European immigrants in 1889 may have 
conferred citizenship rights on the majority of settlers but it did not diminish their rejection of 
the political rights of the Jewish community as an unjust limitation on settler primacy. 
Furthermore, anti-Semitism in the colony was never purely a question of political rights. 
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Rising currents of racial prejudice, promoted by the nascent extreme right in the metropole, 
fuelled hostility toward the Jews, as did a traditional rejection of the Jew as a capitalist by 
elements of the working-class and the Left in the colony.25 Thus, even elements of the 
European population who had bridled at the naturalisation imposed by the law of 1889 and 
did not envy the Jews’ accession to the status of citizenship shared in a common rejection of 
the Algerian Jew. This widespread hostility to the Jew would spill over into violent anti-
Semitic riots across the major cities of Algeria in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair in the 1890s. 
Algeria was also at the forefront of the emergent political movement of anti-Semitism, 
electing candidates standing on ‘anti-Jewish’ platforms to represent the colony at both a local 
and a national level. However, the excesses of anti-Semitic violence directed by these 
political figures would eventually lead to their removal and exclusion from political activity 
by the colonial authorities.26 Their heirs on the extreme right in interwar Algeria would seek 
to emanate their popular success while also avoiding the excess that led to their failure. 
Although the ideology of settler colonialism and that of the French extreme right were 
clearly aligned, the extreme right would not gain a foothold in Algeria until the late 1920s, 
and even then, it was largely a localised phenomenon. The protection of absolute settler 
primacy had long trumped ideological divisions among the vast majority of the political elite 
in the colony, rendering the extreme-right largely irrelevant at a colony-wide level. A 
commitment to political violence and racial hierarchy did not necessarily imply support for 
the replacement of the parliamentary regime with an authoritarian state.27 The French 
Republican colonial state, far from inherently opposed to political violence and racial 
hierarchy, was actually predicated on them. It was only when the primacy of the settler was 
judged to be under threat, first from the Jewish community and subsequently from the 
perceived alliance of the Left, Algerian Muslim movements of reform and metropolitan 
officials, that the extreme-right would thrive in the colony. The very proximity of the 
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ideologies of settler colonialism and the extreme-right meant that the latter could only 
flourish when the former was considered to be under threat. 
 
Dr. Molle’s Oran: A settler utopia 
That the first successful fusion of settler colonial and extreme-right politics would take place 
in the city of Oran was unsurprising. The colony’s second city was the most demographically 
European of the large urban areas. In 1931, the city’s ethnic make-up was estimated as 
follows: 47% European, 44% Algerian Muslim and 8% Jewish.28 A large proportion of the 
European population consisted of recently naturalised settlers, mainly from Spain, who were 
known as néos.29 This group, which resented the Jewish community’s accession to citizenship 
and their supposed power both within the city’s electoral politics and its economic life, would 
constitute the support base for the home-grown extreme-right that would dominate municipal 
politics in the Oran of the late 1920s.   
The movement that would lead the extreme-right to its first major victory in colonial 
Algeria, the Unions Latines (UL), was principally a vehicle for the political ambitions of its 
charismatic leader, a medical doctor named Jules Molle. His political organisation would come 
to dominate politics in the city from 1925 until his untimely death in 1931, with the doctor 
elected not only to serve as Mayor but also as the city’s deputy in the National Assembly in 
Paris. The UL would very effectively adopt the mobilisation techniques of the metropolitan 
extreme-right while defending a programme dominated by the traditional concerns of settler 
colonial politics. The first article of the organisation’s statutes left little doubt to as to its 
political vision:  
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Our goal is to defend the predominance of the philosophical traditions, the social mores 
and the ideal of the citizens of the Latin race against the political machinations of the 
Jewish electoral bloc.30 
The UL in Oran held true to this vision by infusing both its narratives and its policies with three 
discourses grounded in the city’s settler colonial traditions: virulent anti-Semitism, the 
ostentatious celebration of the settlers’ Latin roots and an almost total erasure of the Algerian 
Muslim population.  
The UL’s anti-Semitism was both the driving force behind its political programme and 
the key source of its support among the settler population. The threat posed by the citizenship 
status of Jews was not understood as a purely abstract question; rather, the right of the Algerian 
Jew to vote at municipal and national elections was presented as a direct threat to settler 
primacy. Electoral politics in the colony ‘served as the crucible of status anxieties and 
competition in the colony’, with settlers fearing that the Jewish community would vote as a 
bloc to secure power and patronage at a local and a national level.31 When Dr Molle’s bid to 
win a seat in the 1924 legislative elections proved unsuccessful, he blamed his failure on the 
‘Jewish electoral lobby’.32 His victory in the municipal elections of 1925 came off the back of 
a campaign that openly attacked the city’s Jewish community. Jews were portrayed as a ‘caste 
apart’ whose ‘blind submission to their leaders’ compromised the republican electoral 
system.33 Against this caste stood the new ‘Algerian race’ formed by the ‘three Latin races of 
the Mediterranean basin’, ‘the men of French blood, Spanish blood and Italian blood’.34 Dr 
Molle presented himself as the figure to unite this new race and lead them against the Jews. 
His mouthpiece, Le Petit Oranais, its front-page bedecked with swastikas,35 denounced the 
‘dark powers at the service of Israel’, asserting that ‘Algeria is a colony where a Jewish 
minority dominates a non-Jewish majority’.36 Here the influence of the European extreme right 
was clear, with the paper reproducing articles by leading anti-Semites from Germany and 
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French proto-fascists.37 The focus remained, however, on the Jew’s subversion of settler 
primacy. To this end, the paper went on to call for the government to strips Jews of their 
citizenship and, thus, expel them from the settler polity through the repeal of the Crémieux 
Decree.38 This demand was echoed by one of Molle’s key lieutenants in a meeting of the UL, 
who drew a clear distinction between the settler and this exogenous Other:  
Between Latins and Jews, the only question is one of race and nationality. The Jew is 
Asiatic, a foreigner, an intruder.39 
The UL’s opponents alleged that the movement had gone even further, promising to 
exterminate the Jews. They claimed that that Molle’s supporters had plastered the town with 
posters predicting ‘a Jewish Saint Bartholomew’s Day’ to follow his election.40 Regardless of 
the veracity of this particular allegation, the lyrics of a ‘Latin Marseillaise’ published in the 
pages of Le Petit Oranais in the months prior to the election made clear the movement’s 
commitment to the violent expulsion and/or extermination of the Jewish community: 
On this sacred shore, the children of the Latin people will defend their destiny and drive 
out the abhorrent race. Oh sacred love of our race ... save us from all panic and, if, in the 
terrible assault, one of us falters, tighten his grip on his weapon.41 
At least in its rhetoric, the UL had fully embraced the eliminatory logic that underlay anti-
Semitism within settler colonial politics. 
But while the desire to eradicate the exogenous Other may have been evident in its 
language and ideology, the UL recognised that the long-term viability of the organisation was 
dependant on its ability to conduct an anti-Semitic campaign within or just beyond the 
boundaries of Republican legality.42 There was to be no repeat of the anti-Semitic riots of the 
1890s.43 Molle’s administration avoided overtly violent actions against the Jewish community, 
preferring ‘legal’ forms of discrimination such as economic boycotts and a refusal to hire Jews 
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for jobs in the municipality.44 This strategy, inspired in part by the partial legalism of 
metropolitan and European extreme-right movements, reflected the municipal administration’s 
desire to balance its virulent anti-Semitism with the need to avoid provoking an intervention 
by the Paris-appointed representatives of the colonial state. In this regard, the colonial state 
acted as a brake on the most extreme impulses of the newly combined settler colonial and 
extreme-right politics. Rather than physically exterminating or forcibly exiling the city’s 
Jewish community, the UL administration sought to deny the Jewish community the rights of 
citizenship. This represented an attempt to effect an ‘administrative transfer’ of sovereignty 
from below, with the Oran municipality seeking to erode the Jewish community’s equal status 
within the imperial polity.45 However, as long as the French state remained committed to the 
protection of the citizenship of Algeria’s Jews, the UL’s actions could never achieve their 
ultimate goal of subjecting them to settler sovereignty. 
The UL’s drive to protect settler hegemony and expand settler sovereignty was not only 
articulated in terms of the negation of Jewish rights but was also anchored in the affirmation 
of Latin culture. The movement fully embraced the philosophy advanced by Louis Bertrand 
and his acolytes, rehashing their literary defence of Latinism in its political slogans and 
campaigns. In an address to supporters in April 1925, Dr Molle posed the rhetorical question 
‘why are we Latins?’ His answers offer an insight into the movement’s understanding of the 
place of the settler population within the wider Empire.46 Molle’s response began by recalling 
North Africa’s Roman past and declaring that ‘Latin order and Latin organisation have given 
eternal solidity’ to the settler community’s ‘mores, language, sentiments and customs’. This 
defence of settler particularism was, however, immediately followed by the assertion that ‘we 
are Latins because if we were not we could barely be called Frenchmen’. Here, settler identity 
was not posited in opposition to metropolitan sovereignty but rather the two were presented as 
inextricably intertwined. Once again, it was the ‘wandering destroyers, the hordes of the tribes 
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of Israel’ who were the foil for this articulation of Latin identity. Their supposed avarice was 
contrasted with the heritage of ‘civilisation and humanity’ passed down to the settlers from 
their ‘fathers, to be conserved by the three Latin nations’, Italy, Spain and France.47 This 
assertion of a specifically Latin ‘neo-European replication’ in Algeria was presented as both 
premised on and complementary to continued French imperial sovereignty.48  
If the UL’s defence of settler hegemony and pursuit of settler sovereignty centred on 
the condemnation of the Jewish community, the city’s Algerian Muslim community, a far more 
significant element of the city’s population, was largely absent from the movement’s rhetoric. 
Given their near total exclusion from political power, the UL viewed the Muslim population as 
far less of a threat than the Jewish community. Furthermore, the fact that Oran was a majority 
European city meant that the perceived existential threat posed by the indigenous population 
was not as potent as in the countryside. This meant that the Muslims could be easily ignored. 
This absence, which was never absolute, should not be mistaken for indifference.49 Rather, it 
represented a form of what Lorenzo Veracini has termed ‘perception transfer’ in which 
‘indigenous peoples are disavowed in a variety of ways and their actual presence is not 
registered’.50 By largely excluding the indigenous presence from political discourse, the UL 
ensured that their presence in the imperial polity and any form of sovereignty they might 
exercise was not acknowledged. When, in the 1930s, both the political environment in Algeria 
and the movements that constituted the extreme-right in the colony changed radically, silence 
around the indigenous prsence would, as we shall see, no longer be a viable strategy.  
 
Metropolitan movements and settler politics in Algeria 
The sudden death of Dr Molle in 1931 marked the end of one era of extreme-right settler 
politics in Algeria and the beginning of another. By and large, the focus of the extreme-right 
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in the Algeria of the 1930s would shift away from the theatre of municipal politics and towards 
the kind of mass politics that was increasingly dominant in both Europe and the colony itself. 
Unlike the home-grown UL, the principal movements who would seek to rally the inhabitants 
of Algeria to the cause of the extreme-right in this period mostly originated in the metropole. 
Groups such as the Croix de Feu (CdF), the Parti Social Français (PSF) and the Parti 
Populaire Français (PPF) would actively seek to blend the metropolitan discourses of the 
extreme-right with those of settler colonial politics in a bid to win over the support of the 
European population of Algeria. Once more, anti-Semitism would act as a bridge between these 
two distinct political traditions.  
However, unlike the UL, the new mass movements of the extreme right in the colony 
would have to contend with the irruption of an increasingly politicised Algerian Muslim 
population onto the political scene. The rise of mass movements among the indigenous 
population demanding a reconfiguration of the colonial order, or, in the case of the growing 
nationalist movement, its total destruction, fuelled the fusion of extreme-right and settler 
colonial politics.  The efforts of Algeria’s extreme right to acknowledge the place of the Muslim 
within the settler polity without ever compromising settler primacy offer fascinating insights 
into the constantly shifting dynamics of the triangular relationship underpinning politics in the 
colony. 
Before we analyse the discourses that emerged from the intersection of settler colonial 
and extreme-right politics in the Algeria of the 1930s, we must first briefly consider the history 
of the movements that would spearhead this synthesis. The Croix de Feu had initially been 
founded in the metropole as an elite veterans’ association in 1927. Following the assumption 
of its leadership by the Colonel de La Rocque in 1930, the CdF soon morphed into a movement 
of the extreme-right.51 Its Algerian branch was registered in 1929, initially focusing specifically 
on attracting support among veterans.52 By 1933, it had fully embraced the politics of 
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nationalism.53 In 1935, the Algerian branches of the CdF counted 14000 members.54 The 
accession to power in the metropole of the left-wing Popular Front government in 1936 would 
lead to the dissolution of the CdF and its replacement by the Parti Social Français (PSF). By 
1939, this successor movement counted some 26000 members across the colony.55 The PSF’s 
biggest rival in Algeria had a rather different historical background. In early 1936, onetime 
Communist youth leader and anti-colonial activist Jacques Doriot, founded the Parti Populaire 
Français (PPF) in his electoral fief, the working-class suburb of Paris, St. Denis. The PPF’s 
operations in North Africa were directed by another former Communist and close associate of 
Doriot, Victor Arrighi. By 1938, its membership in Algeria had reached 20000.56 These 
movements came to dominate politics among the settler community, while also making minor 
inroads into the indigenous population. 
For the new mass movements of the extreme right, anti-Semitism would prove a key, 
if occasionally problematic, means of securing support among the settler population. The 
leadership of the CdF had officially repudiated anti-Semitism in the metropole and the 
movement initially seemed reticent to employ it openly in the colony.57 Tensions constantly 
arose between the movement’s cadres, who attempted to rein in open anti-Semitism, and local 
activists, who fully endorsed it. This was certainly the case in the city of Constantine, where 
CdF activists played an important role in stoking resentment against the Jews among the 
Algerian Muslim population in the lead up to the anti-Semitic riots that shook the city in August 
1934.58 The disturbances, which left twenty-five dead from the Jewish community and three 
from the Muslim community, seemed to epitomise the anti-Semitic alliance of settler and 
Algerian Muslim once promoted by the UL. The eliminatory logic long present in the anti-
Semitic rhetoric of the extreme right in the colony had briefly become a reality. Although the 
anti-Semites within CdF would never again provoke a pogrom as deadly as the events of 1934 
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in Constantine, activists across the colony continued to organise boycotts and incite violence 
against Jews.59    
Nevertheless, the CdF leadership would seek to suppress the most extreme anti-Semitic 
elements within the movement in the colony. A letter from the organisation’s leader in Algeria  
to the Governor General acknowledged that ‘a good number [of members] are inclined to be 
unsympathetic to the Jews’, declaring that the left-wing politics of the Jews was to blame for 
this.60 Despite shifting the blame onto the Jewish community itself, he asserted that the 
movement was committed to preventing ‘comrades from making personal comments that could 
engage the responsibility of the movement’.61 This was hardly a forceful condemnation of the 
ideology behind these comments, but it did represent a desire to distance the CdF from open 
anti-Semitism. In this phase of its development, the CdF leadership sought to remain not only 
within the boundaries of republican legality but also those of republican respectability as it 
sought to establish itself as the dominant force on the Right in both metropole and colony.  
The Algerian branch of the Parti Social Français, successor to the CdF, proved less 
hesitant than its predecessor organisation in endorsing political anti-Semitism.62 Faced with 
fierce competition, both in the metropole and in Algeria, from rival movements of the 
extreme-right, particularly Doriot’s PPF, the party cadres seemed more willing to give 
activists free rein in Algeria and this almost invariably meant an upsurge in anti-Semitism.63 
This was further fuelled by the fact that the Popular Front, led by a Jewish Prime Minister, 
was proposing colonial reforms that settlers considered a threat to their sovereignty. The 
PSF’s anti-Semitism was now framed in terms of the growing threat to settler primacy posed 
by the Left and its Jewish allies. Here the extreme-right tradition of anti-Communism was 
fused with the settlers’ long-standing fear of a Muslim rebellion. The Jew was now presented 
as a ‘born revolutionary’ who sought to overthrow the existing order in both metropole and 
colony.64 An anti-Semitic cartoon appearing in the pages of the PSF’s North African 
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newspaper La Flamme in 1937 testifies to the fear that Jewish agitators from the International 
Ligue against Anti-Semitism (LICA) were manipulating the Muslim population into 
expelling the settlers for their own profit:  
 
 
Figure 1: ‘Do you get it, Ahmed? When the settlers are driven into the sea, I will loan 
you the money at a fair rate of interest so you can cultivate their lands’. La Flamme, 
16/04/1937.65 
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Where the UL had once condemned the Jew for his subversion of settler primacy from within 
the settler polity through his use of his unjustly attained electoral rights, the PSF now 
denounced his perceived collaboration with Leftists in the metropole and indigenous radicals 
in the colony who sought to subvert settler primacy from without. In October 1938, the 
Congress of the Constantine Federation of the PSF officially endorsed the boycott of Jewish 
businesses in the city.66 Such moves, which had once been repressed by the CdF leadership, 
were now tolerated by a PSF leadership who realised that in order to succeed in this settler 
colonial context the extreme-right would have to openly embrace anti-Semitism while also 
ensuring it never descended into the kind of violence that would provoke repression by the 
colonial authorities.  
The PSF’s major rival, Jacques Doriot’s PPF, showed far less qualms than the CdF and 
the PSF in embracing virulent anti-Semitism. Initially the PPF had refused to endorse anti-
Semitism and some of its most prominent members were Jewish.67 Nevertheless, the 
movement’s leader in Algeria, Victor Arrighi recognised that the party’s earlier rejection of 
anti-Semitism alienated large swathes of the European population and moved to incorporate 
anti-Jewish policies into the party’s platform.68 In 1938, the party called for the repeal of the 
Crémieux decree, a radical measure never officially endorsed by the PSF. In his address to the 
Second North African Congress of the PPF, on November 12th 1938, Arrighi argued that the 
revocation of the citizenship of Algeria’s Jews was necessary to prevent the ‘permanent 
blackmail by this racist bloc’.69 In its effort to mobilise support among the settler community, 
the PPF had gone from rejecting anti-Semitism to endorsing the expulsion of the Jews from the 
settler polity by stripping them of their political rights.  
While the anti-Semitic policies and rhetoric adopted with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm by the mass movements of the extreme-right in the Algeria of the 1930s reflected 
the traditions of settler politics in the colony, the same could not be said for their language and 
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their programmes around the “Muslim question”. Indeed, the very fact that they developed 
policies for and addressed appeals to the Algerian Muslim population differentiated them 
substantially from the movements that preceded them, including the UL. This was, in part, due 
to the radically changed political environment in which they were operating. The rise of mass 
movements for reform among the Muslim population and their cooperation with the Left in the 
colony, would require the extreme-right to develop a range of policies designed to placate, and 
if possible recruit, Muslim Algerians. Furthermore, the Popular Front government’s 
commitment to colonial reform pressurised the extreme-right movements into offering counter 
proposals which they posited could satisfy the indigenous without compromising settler 
sovereignty. The project proposed by the Popular Front Prime Minister Léon Blum and the 
former Governor General of Algeria Maurice Viollette provided for the integration of a small 
portion of the indigenous elite (circa 21000) as full citizens of the Republic while preserving 
their Muslim personal status. These new citizens were to be drawn from the ranks of the 
indigenes who had proven their loyalty and capacity to serve France, including many of the 
educated elites and some, but not all, veterans.70 Much to the horror of the vast majority of the 
settlers, the essential principle of the incompatibility of citizenship and the personal status was 
set to be breached. They turned to the extreme right to defend settler primacy. 
However, the desire of the extreme-right movements to engage with the indigenous 
population was not purely a product of circumstances; it was also reflective of the broader 
imperial projects defended by these movements. Unlike the UL, the political action of the CdF, 
the PSF and the PPF were not localised phenomena, but, rather, they cultivated support bases 
throughout Algeria, metropolitan France and the Empire. While the UL sought above all to 
impose settler primacy under the protection of the French Empire, these movements aspired to 
remake Algeria, France and her Empire in the authoritarian mould of the French extreme right. 
Thus, the UL’s policy of largely ignoring the Muslim was abandoned in favour of pro-active 
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effort to incorporate them into a strictly hierarchical form of imperial rule. In this way, settler 
primacy could be recast as part of a more sophisticated and politically palatable defence of 
exclusion rooted in the rhetoric of French republican imperialism. 
Unsurprisingly for movements whose origins lay in a veterans’ association, the CdF 
and its successor the PSF turned to the Great War as the inspiration for reimagining the place 
of the Algerian Muslim in the imperial polity. The fact that thousands of Algerian Muslims had 
served on the battlefields of Northern France and South-Eastern Europe, alongside settlers and 
metropolitan Frenchmen, for the same cause but with different legal status and conditions of 
service, made the war the ideal prism through which a new imperial settlement could be 
articulated. Both groups saw the war as a moment of unity and discipline, in which 
collaboration across racial lines did not compromise the colonial hierarchy. Certain elite 
Muslim figures, most notably Maître Iba Zizen, a Kabyle lawyer, Catholic convert and 
naturalised French citizen, rose to prominence within the organisation, leading the recruitment 
drive for Muslim members. In January 1936, Iba Zizen spoke of the need to recreate the unity 
of the dark days of the war, calling on European members to help educate his fellow Muslim-
origin Algerians to shun the revolutionary manoeuvres of the Communists and nationalists.71 
He was appointed to head the PSF’s Commission of Indigenous Affairs in 193772 and would 
ensure that the supposedly new movement’s discourse remained anchored in calls for the 
Muslims to rally to the ‘generosity and benevolence’ of France as evidenced during the war.73 
In this regard, he was echoing the sentiments repeatedly expressed by the movement’s leader, 
the Colonel De La Rocque. As we have seen in the introduction to this article, De La Rocque’s 
visits to Algeria were often punctuated by appeals to the Muslim population to recreate the 
unity of the war and embrace a form of collaboration that respected settler primacy. In contrast 
to the settler colonial narrative of Algeria’s past, which placed the settler centre-stage and 
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effaced the Muslim population, the CdF and PSF embraced the Great War as a means of 
attracting (very limited) Muslim support. 
Nevertheless, evoking the glory days of the Great War would not be sufficient on its 
own to defeat Blum-Viollette. The leaders of CdF/PSF realised that they would have to offer 
an alternative programme for reform that could in some way meet the demands of the 
increasingly restive Muslim populations while maintaining the crucial boundary between 
citizen and subject that underpinned settler sovereignty. The PSF’s rival project envisaged the 
naturalisation of all veterans once they renounced the personal status, a requirement that had 
proven historically toxic to the vast majority of Algerians. While the PSF cloaked the extremely 
limited extension of political rights contained in its counter-project in the language of the Great 
War, what it really sought was a return to the unity of the war, when Muslim Algerians fought 
in the trenches for France, not on the streets of Algeria for the Popular Front and even the 
nationalists. The memory of the Great War and the unity of forces, political and racial, that 
supposedly had defined it, was mobilised to justify the PSF’s refusal to contemplate any 
weakening of settler primacy. 
In contrast to the PSF, the PPF placed imperial policy at the very centre of its political 
programme, asserting that the renewal of France would come from the strength of her ‘Empire 
of a hundred million Frenchmen’.74 Its vision of the empire was anchored in the appeal to a 
Greater France, a transcontinental nation where the colonial populations were bound together 
by ‘indissoluble ties of affection and duty’.75 The movement’s leader, Jacques Doriot, had 
extensive experience of North Africa and of strategies of appealing to subject populations from 
his days as the Communists’ expert on colonial issues. The party produced bilingual 
propaganda in Arabic and French celebrating the ‘loyalty, proven many times, of the Muslim 
masses’, celebrating France ‘as the common Fatherland of Frenchman of all faiths’ and 
promising to ‘raise the standards of living of millions of Algerian workers’.76 This promotion 
23 
 
of an imperial project built on an ‘intimate and hierarchical relationship’ between the subject 
populations and France attracted a number of high profile Muslims who would lead efforts to 
expand the party’s base among the Algerian Muslim community.77  Muslims were given 
positions on decision-making bodies within the movement, with one, Dr Djilali Bentami 
serving on the North African Central Committee of the Party.  
Indeed, the PPF campaign to rally elements of the Muslim community to its cause 
proved much more vigorous and ultimately more successful than that of its rivals, with the 
party securing a significant Muslim membership (circa 20%).78 This may be, in part, ascribed 
to the more sweeping nature of the reforms endorsed by the PPF. In its counter-proposal to the 
Blum-Viollette Project, the PPF went much further than its rivals in the PSF, advocating the 
election by universal male suffrage, in a separate Muslim-only electoral college, of a quantity 
of indigenous deputies equal in number to those elected by the settlers.79 The PPF also adopted 
a somewhat ambiguous rhetoric regarding the growing nationalist movement, the Parti du 
Peuple Algérien, in its propaganda towards the Muslim population, echoing the latter’s radical 
discourse but stripping it of those elements that challenged settler primacy.80 The PPF was 
eager to give the impression that Muslims would have a voice in its proposed imperial order. 
 
Nevertheless, for all its declared commitment to reform, the PPF remained resolutely 
married to the idea of settler primacy. Its counter-project, though more generous than that of 
the PSF, perpetuated the separation between citizens and subjects that ensured continued settler 
dominance within the imperial polity. The PPF repeatedly made clear its commitment to the 
primacy of the settler and its belief that an authoritarian nationalist empire would restore social 
order and peace. In 1936, Dr Bentami rejected the Blum-Viollette Project by asserting that the 
Muslims ‘prefer to remain subjects under the folds of the French tricolour than be free citizens 
under the German or Russian boot’.81 In a meeting celebrating Doriot’s visit to Algiers in May 
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1938, Victor Arrighi declared that what was lacking above all else in Algeria was a leader, one 
who could inspire both love and discipline in the Muslim population:  
When there was a chief, the Muslims loved us. When there is no one left to rule us but a 
coalition of Jews and incompetent politicians, they hate us.82 
While the PPF acknowledged the necessity of reform, it believed that Algeria’s future, and that 
of the wider Empire, was dependent on the restoration of authority. Indeed, on one occasion, 
much to the displeasure of Dr Bentami, Arrighi addressed a settler-dominated meeting in Oran, 
assuring the crowd that France was ‘not yet so ruined and so weak as to not be able to buy 
machine guns and canons’ to repress any Muslim rebellion.83 The PPF’s dedication to the 
maintenance of settler primacy, by violence if necessary, was never in doubt.  
In fact, it was this sense among the settlers that the movements of the extreme right 
were unshakeably committed to their continued dominance in the colony that permitted these 
movements to adopt policies in favour of the Muslim that ran contrary to the traditions of settler 
colonial politics in Algeria. The acceptance, at least nominally, by the settler population of a 
recasting of settler primacy in terms of broader imperial projects that implied the limited 
political empowerment of indigenous Algerians has wider implications for our understanding 
of the settler colonial polity in Algeria. The settlers’ prime concern was always the maintenance 
of their primacy. In their pursuit of this goal, they were willing to countenance some deviation 
from the norms of settler colonial politics, tolerating the existence of a wider imperial discourse 
alongside the tropes of Latinism and even acquiescing to the recognition of an extremely 
restricted form of indigenous franchise.  
 
Conclusion: settler primacy vs. settler sovereignty 
If the story of the extreme-right in the interwar period has one major insight to offer into the 
dynamic of politics in colonial Algeria, it is this: in a demographic context where settlers 
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were a clear minority, settler primacy would always prove more important than settler 
sovereignty. Although the settlers may well have aspired to total control over all affairs in the 
colony, they grudgingly accepted that their reliance on metropolitan power and the 
encroachment on their sovereignty that this implied. Their need to remain within the wider 
French imperial framework for their security constrained their ability to realise the settler 
utopia in Algeria. A localised movement like the UL, which mobilised the strategies of the 
extreme-right in defence of the classic programme of settler colonial politics, had to tread a 
fine line between maximising settler sovereignty through the expulsion of the Jews from the 
settler polity and provoking an unwanted intervention by the colonial authorities. The task 
was even more complicated for settlers who turned to the Algerian branches of the 
metropolitan extreme-right movements in the 1930s. Faced with the concrete threat posed by 
the Blum-Viollette Project and its breach of the boundary between subject and settler, they 
would have to row in behind reform programmes that undermined settler claims to a 
monopoly on sovereignty. Furthermore, by handing over their fate to the metropolitan 
movements they allowed for the emergence of alternative narratives of Algeria’s past, present 
and future that were not solely anchored in settler colonial tropes but also evoked a wider 
vision of authoritarian republican imperialism. Thus, even the most ardent defenders of settler 
rule accepted the compromises with rival forms of sovereignty, Algerian Muslim, 
metropolitan and imperial, necessary for the maintenance of settler predominance. 
Of course, the dilemmas facing the settlers in Algeria in this regard were by no means 
unique to this ‘problematic settler colony’.84 As Veracini points out, in those societies where 
the settler polity was subsumed within national and imperial structures, ‘both operating 
within a constraining colonial framework and entirely outside of it can be fatal’. The settlers’ 
solution to this problem, he asserts, was to ‘think in isopolitical ways and routinely imagine a 
single political community across separate jurisdictions’.85 However, the reality of the 
26 
 
practice of politics in Algeria would require much more of settlers than simply conceiving of 
an isopolitical model for political rule in the colony. Rather, they would have to constantly 
engage with the metropolitan authorities and eventually even with some members of the 
Muslim community in their efforts to negotiate the future structure of rule in the colony. In 
the process, they proved willing to cede elements of settler sovereignty to rival metropolitan, 
and to a lesser extent Muslim, sovereignties on the condition that settler primacy in the 
colony would go untouched. This means that, in a settler colony like Algeria, where the 
demographics ensured that the settlers’ grip on power was always precarious, the dynamic 
between settler and metropole was weighted in favour of the latter. The embrace of 
metropolitan and/or imperial forms of sovereignty, even when they implied a limited 
extension of rights for the Muslim, was a price worth paying.  
The case of the extreme right in Algeria has wider implications for the application of 
settler colonial theory to political life in Algeria and, perhaps, by extension, to other settler 
colonies where the indigenous population significantly outnumbered the settlers. If even the 
most zealous defenders of settler hegemony recognised that their best interests lay not in the 
pursuit of a form of settler sovereignty but rather in the pooling of sovereignty with the 
imperial state and, possibly, with the indigenous population, the applicability of settler 
colonial theory to the politics in the colony seems questionable. Among the leaders of the 
settler population, it seems, the logic of the preservation of settler rule trumped the logic of 
elimination.86  
However, the fact that the strategy employed by the leaders of the extreme right in 
interwar Algeria, particularly in the latter part of the period, does not seem to slot into the 
analytical framework proposed by settler colonial theory does not render this theory 
irrelevant to students of the colony’s political history. Settler colonial theory may not explain 
the vagaries of the negotiation of colonial rule in Algeria and in comparable colonial 
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contexts, but it does give insight into both the structures and the mentalities that underpinned 
colonial rule. Just because the eliminatory logic of settler colonialism was marginal in the 
policies and, to a lesser extent, the rhetoric of extreme right movements in the interwar period 
does not mean that it did not continue to inform, even define, the attitudes of these 
movements’ supporters. After all, when the notion that pooling sovereignty with metropolitan 
France would protect settler hegemony began to fall apart in the latter years of the Algerian 
War, the successors to the extreme right in the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS) 
wholeheartedly embraced the logic of elimination once more. The case of the OAS would 
suggest that, while the extreme right and its supporters may have chosen, during the interwar 
period, to strategically minimise the tropes of settler colonial politics in an effort to ensure the 
continued availability of French imperial coercive power, they do not seem to have ever fully 
abandoned the aspiration for a sovereign settler polity. Thus, when historians come to 
consider the political strategies pursued by settler political movements in colonial situations 
comparable to that of Algeria, they should be wary of taking “liberal” rhetoric and policies at 
face value. Behind the trumpeting of a new racial and political order grounded in cooperation, 
the logic of elimination may well live on as a key, if not the key, feature of settler colonial 
politics.
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Figure 1. ‘Do you get it, Ahmed? When the settlers are driven into the sea, I will loan you the 
money at a fair rate of interest so you can cultivate their lands’. La Flamme, 16/04/1937 
 
